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1 Introduction 
 
On Thursday 23 June 2016, 16.1 million people in the United Kingdom voted for their 
nation to remain a member of the European Union. However, 17.4 million voters chose to 
leave, sparking an immediate political frenzy. On Friday morning at 8:15 a.m., Prime 
Minister David Cameron announced his resignation after a six-year premiership. The Great 
British Pound dropped to a 31-year low. 
The UK’s relationship with the EU has consistently been questioned by both British elites 
and the public — and other European nations — since its first application to join in 1961 and 
eventual accession in 1973. The first referendum on membership of the European 
Community (as it was then known), held in 1975, revealed that 67 percent of voters 
supported the UK’s accession. The debate, nevertheless, continued, and by 2015, the public 
mood was clear — immigration reform was a priority, according to opinion polls. From June 
2015 to February 2016, Cameron and his team renegotiated the terms of the UK’s 
membership, hoping to convince the public that remaining within the EU yielded more 
benefits than costs. Whether Cameron’s discussions with Brussels were enough was now up 
to Britons. The June referendum was officially announced on 20 February 2016.  
In early 2016, the media, business world and financial markets held an assumption that 
the status quo would likely endure after June. Since the results of the referendum, an 
impressive post-mortem has been conducted on the Leave vote. Plenty of literature has 
sought to explain the surprise result by investigating campaign strategies of both sides, trends 
in opinion polling, and the political environment surrounding the debate. There has been 
consensus that the largest driver of the Leave vote, both in terms of campaign strategy and 
public opinion, was the prevalent feeling of the need for immigration control. 
This article strives to contribute to understandings of the sociological aspects of anti-
immigration sentiment in the context of the Leave vote. Specifically, it is an investigation of 
British public opinion on race, culture, identity, and xenophobia, and how this manifests into 
a pervasive anti-immigration societal attitude. In other words, this article seeks to explain to 
what extent the Leave vote was caused by issues of racial identity. 
Current literature suggests that anti-immigrant sentiment within the EU membership 
debates is caused primarily by fear of cultural pluralism and the perception of economic 
burden that immigrants bring. A gap in the literature can be found in accounting for the role 
of racism (discrimination based on skin color, separate from cultural xenophobia) in the 
Brexit debates. In the context of immigration, this article compares whether racial concerns 
were more instrumental than economic concerns in pushing Britons to vote Leave. 
The next section outlines theoretical and historical frameworks for understanding public 
opinion on identity, culture, and race, as well as whether these opinions contribute to anti-
immigrant sentiment more than economic concerns. It also explains some media effects in 
causing anti-immigrant attitudes. Section three provides a review of current literature on 
explaining the result of the 2016 referendum, including a focus on explaining opposition to 
immigration. Section four dives into empirical analyses of public opinion data, evaluating the 
comparative explanatory power of race and economic concerns within the 2016 referendum 
debates. Section five discusses these data, evaluating them against existing literature and 
frameworks of understanding, as well as previous opinion polling.  
 
2 Theory and history: public opinion on identity issues in immigration 
 
Scholarship on public opinion on immigration has been widespread. This review focuses 
on a few areas of identity politics concerns within anti-immigrant sentiment. Firstly, it looks 
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 at research on British attitudes towards different ethnic groups and immigrants from differing 
regions. Secondly, it reviews research on people’s fear of cultural pluralism and concerns 
over the potential threat of immigrants to national identity. This article seeks to compare the 
importance of identity politics and economic concerns in shaping anti-immigrant sentiment, 
so the third section of this chapter gauges existing studies that execute this multivariate 
analysis. 
 
Ethnic hierarchy 
 
Researchers have conducted and analyzed various public opinion polls investigating 
discrepant attitudes towards different immigrant groups. Specifically, relevant results 
compare immigrants’ region of origin and race. Saggar (2003) found that negative sentiments 
are not purely based on color, citing a 2001 ICM poll which showed that every age group of 
respondents emphatically disapproved of having Romanian immigrants as neighbors. Almost 
every age group approved of having Chinese neighbors. The poll also revealed that almost 
every group of respondents approved of white South African asylum seekers as neighbors, 
while almost every group disapproved of Afghan and Iraqi asylum seekers, suggesting a 
complex mix of attitudes relating to differing perceptions based on national origin (Saggar 
2003, 187). 
While Saggar found opposition to certain white Eastern European immigrants, 
diminishing the importance of skin color, a wealth of scholarship points to the importance of 
the white versus non-white divide. Ford (2011) pointed to historical evidence emphasizing 
that non-white immigration is far more opposed by the public than white immigration. Early 
settlements of Polish wartime refugees and workers from Mediterranean Europe and Ireland 
caused little public resistance compared to the hostility faced by South Asian and Caribbean 
migrants. ‘Race riots’ occurred in Notting Hill (1958), Toxteth and Brixton (1981), and 
Bradford and Burnley (2001) in areas with concentrations of black and Asian immigrants and 
their descendants (Cantle, cited in Ford 2011, 1020), while there have never been riots of this 
scale against white immigrants. By 2008, the population of West European migrants had 
surpassed that of Indian-born migrants, which did not result in public interest, suggesting the 
higher acceptability of white immigrants (Ford 2011, 1020). 
Historical evidence in terms of policy also reveal ethnic hierarchies in the minds of the 
public. While West European migrants have been uncontroversial, Eastern European arrivals 
have attracted significant media attention and are monitored by the Home Office (Ford 2011, 
1022). Within non-white migration, a ranking ladder is also apparent. The 1950s saw 
Westminster’s defense of migration from the West Indies; this population was regarded as 
more ‘British’ than South Asians (Hansen, cited in Ford 2011, 1022). Recently, Muslims 
have been seen as more ‘threatening’ than Afro-Carribbeans (Ford and Goodwin, cited in 
Ford 2011, 1022). 
Ford also used data from six British Social Attitudes surveys to provide further evidence 
of an ethnic hierarchy, with each white ethnic group above the non-white groups. The 
surveys, conducted between 1983 and 1996, reveal that the least opposed group of 
immigrants are Australians and New Zealanders, followed by Western Europeans, Eastern 
Europeans, and then (in order of preference) immigrants from Hong Kong, Africa, the West 
Indies, and South Asia (Ford 2011, 1026). 
Kaufmann (2014) compared Eastern Europeans with non-white groups from other 
regions, and found that while white British ‘habituate’ to both Eastern European and non-
European immigrant groups, assimilation occurs far more rapidly among European 
immigrants than minorities. Forty-six percent of people classified as children of 
‘Mediterranean Commonwealth’ immigrants on the 1971 Census considered themselves as 
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 dominant white British by 2011. Meanwhile, there is a majority attitude that visible 
minorities are not accepted as fully ‘one of us’ (Kaufmann 2014, 271). 
 
Cultural unity 
 
Replicated research has highlighted that perceptions of immigrant groups differ 
depending on the group’s perceived threat to cultural unity and national identity.  
In the United States, Bogardus (1925) showed that individuals preferred to live among 
people associated with the dominant White Anglo-Saxon Protestant group, as opposed to 
those that were racially, religiously or linguistically different from the dominant group 
(Bogardus, cited in Ford 2011, 1019). Preferences based on ethnic proximity to the majority, 
dominant group have also been found in Canada and Holland. Saggar (2003) cited the 1997 
British Election Study which revealed resistance to cultural pluralism. Of white respondents, 
71 percent agreed that ‘it is far better for immigrants to adapt and blend into society,’ rather 
than keep their customs and traditions (British Election Study, cited in Saggar 2003, 186). 
Kaufmann (2014) noted that ethnic minorities are perceived as the greatest threat when 
immigrants are close but not too close (the ‘halo effect’). Diversity in one’s city or local 
authority adds to threat perceptions because of immigrants’ potential to introduce large-scale 
change, but Kaufmann’s study showed that positive contact with minorities mitigated fears 
(Kaufmann 2014, 272). 
Kaufmann also discussed that England did not experience the same ‘recasting’ of its 
national identity in favor of multiculturalism that the United States did in the 1960s. The 
conjuncture of specific liberal historical events, such as the Civil Rights movement, helped 
reframe the United States within a ‘nation of immigrants’ narrative. The fact that Anglo-
Saxon settlement happened in England over a thousand years earlier than in the United 
States, coupled with the limited immigration prior to 1948, consolidated a ‘native’ English 
ethnic group. Most western European ethnic majorities use their nation’s name to describe 
their ethnic group, providing an indigenousness that acts as an obstacle to introducing 
multiculturalism into their national identities (Kaufmann 2014, 274-75). 
 
Are racial and cultural concerns stronger than economic? 
 
The two types of identity-politics concerns that voters may hold regarding immigration 
are race (or skin color) and culture — the ideas, social behavior and customs that differ 
among societies. Another factor that may lead to anti-immigration is economic concerns, for 
example immigrants’ perceived burden on national resources, or the added competition for 
jobs. 
Multivariate experiments are particularly useful to answer the question of why people 
harbor anti-immigrant sentiments. Studies have compared the relative importance of racism, 
concerns over multiculturalism, the economy, and other influences. 
There is a multitude of research that justifies anti-immigrant sentiment in economic 
terms. Duffy’s (2004) survey found high levels of resentment towards asylum seekers and 
recent migrants, as opposed to minorities, over the concern of the use of public resources 
(Duffy, cited in Somerville 2007, 132). Halman (2001) found that British attitudes towards 
immigrants on the issue of racial diversity are more positive than the EU average (Halman, 
cited in Somerville 2007, 132). 
However, multiple studies indicate that a preference for cultural unity is the strongest 
predictor of anti-immigrant sentiment. In their experimental study, Sniderman et al. (2004) 
found that Dutch hostility to immigrants is amplified by describing them in cultural rather 
than economic terms (Sniderman et al., cited in Ford 2011, 1019). Ivarsflaten (2005) 
3
Hu: Did Racism Cause Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Brexit?
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
 acknowledged the research that explains public opinion on immigration in terms of economic 
concerns, but highlighted that most studies which compare economy and identity 
explanations find that cultural concerns more strongly influence opinions on immigration 
(Burns and Gimpel; Gibson, cited in Ivarsflaten 2005, 23). Dustmann and Preston (2003) 
tested the variables of race against welfare concerns and economic competition, and found 
race to be the key determinant (Dustmann and Preston, cited in Somerville 2007, 132). 
Ford (2011) once again used historical evidence to argue against the notion that hostility 
to non-white immigration is driven by fear of increased economic competition for jobs and 
government resources. Far-right mobilizations by the National Front in the 1970s (Husbands, 
cited in Ford 2011, 1020), and the British National Party since 1999 (Eatwell and Goodwin, 
cited in Ford 2011, 1020), have been on non-white immigrants. Irish, European and 
Australian immigrants have often migrated to Britain in larger numbers but Ford discussed 
the lack of political movements against these groups. Although Ford’s article predates the 
2016 referendum (and its unique circumstances) by five years, he argued that there is strong 
historical evidence of non-white migrants garnering more passionate and organized 
opposition than white migrants (Ford 2011). 
Ivarsflaten’s (2005) influential study used multivariate analysis to pit cultural unity 
concerns against other factors in determining individual preferences for immigration policy. 
The study found that a preference for cultural unity matters more than all other variables 
taken together, including concerns about the national economy and racism. In the model of 
maximum impact, where respondents feel strongly about one explanatory variable but 
average on other concerns, belief in cultural unity is five times more influential than concerns 
about the national economy. Racism is also influential in this model (meaning that strong 
feelings of racism can have a significant impact on people’s preferences), but in the model 
showing current impact of each variable observed today, racism is not more influential than 
concerns about the economy (Ivarsflaten 2005). 
Ware (2008) discussed the racialization of economic concerns. Immigration arouses a 
sense of resentment from the white working class, for whom inequality and perceptions of 
unfairness are compounded by fear of multiculturalism and the visible changes in the 
community around them (Ware 2008, 2). 
This article also seeks to compare the relative importance of identity and economy 
concerns, in the context of immigration debates surrounding the 2016 referendum on the 
UK’s EU membership. 
 
Erroneous perceptions 
 
It is necessary to note that a significant contributor to anti-immigrant sentiment may be a 
lack of awareness of the proportion and size of immigrants, as well as minorities, in the 
population. A 2000 MORI/Reader’s Digest poll found that the average estimate of the size of 
the ethnic population was 26 percent of the UK population, at a time when the actual figure 
was seven percent. The poll also revealed that the average estimate for the proportion of 
migrants and asylum seekers was 51 percent of the population, when in reality it was four 
percent. Among the public, ethnic minorities, immigrants and asylum seekers are often 
viewed as one group. Several polls reveal that more intolerant population subgroups are more 
likely to have erroneous views of migrant and ethnic populations (Saggar 2003, 185). 
Blinder’s (2015) study found that both EU and non-EU nationals appear prominently in 
mental images of immigrants. Sixty-two percent of respondents pictured non-EU nationals as 
immigrants, while 51 percent pictured EU nationals, which overstated the 2010 EU-
immigrant proportion of 30 percent (Blinder 2015, 89). 
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 Two significant influencers of public opinion are media effects and elite influence in the 
form of policymaking, with the former having the potential to heavily impact perceptions of 
the numbers and characteristics of immigrants. 
Past literature has suggested that incorrect estimates of immigrant proportions may stem 
from the large quantity of media coverage or the tendency to inflate the prominence of salient 
minority groups (Baker et al., cited in Blinder 2018, 1448). In terms of the composition of 
different immigrant types, media framing has been found to be an effective tool in 
influencing perceptions. Blinder’s (2018) analysis of British newspaper coverage from 2013 
revealed that the two most common modifiers of ‘immigrant’ were ‘illegal’ and 
‘EU’/’European,’ consistent with analyses from the past decade, even though irregular 
migrants only comprised 11 percent of the foreign-born population. Immigrants from outside 
the EU were also greater in quantity than those from within (Blinder 2018, 1450). Blinder 
also noted that racial framing is rare. Although national origin is frequently mentioned, the 
avoidance of racial terms may be attributed to efforts by anti-immigration elites to ‘detoxify’ 
immigration (Partos and Bale, cited in Blinder 2018, 1451). 
Blinder’s own experiment explicitly tested the effects of framing on perceptions, but it 
found that neither an ‘Eastern European’ nor an ‘illegal’ frame was able to shift public 
perceptions on innumeracy. This was attributed to the fact that ‘illegal’ was already the most 
common modifier, and thus, participants were already overly exposed to the phrase for the 
experiment to add any further effect (Blinder 2018, 1455). 
A 2016 paper by Blinder et al. moved beyond explaining quantitative perceptions to 
explore the effect of the ‘illegal’ frame on qualitative perceptions of immigrants. British 
media outlets’ consistent emphasis on illegal immigration causes illegality to be associated 
deeply with immigration, depicts immigrants as law-violators, and infuses immigrants with a 
taint of criminality, according to the conceptual metaphor theory. Language in news reports 
contributes to asylum seekers’ routine conflation with immigrants (Blinder et al. 2016, 18-
24). 
Elite policymaking can also play a part in qualitative perceptions of immigrants. From the 
beginning of post-war immigration policy, there has been a preference for white immigrants. 
From the privilege of immigrants from white-majority former colonies to the lack of policy-
maker interest at growing Western European immigration in the 2000s, elites have socialized 
the public to adopt diverging attitudes on different migrant groups. For example, Whitehall 
has been more willing to defend West Indian migration than South Asian, in reference to the 
former’s greater cultural proximity to ‘Britishness’ (Hansen, cited in Ford 2011, 1022). 
Ivarsflaten (2005) hypothesized that elites can influence public opinion by disseminating that 
reducing immigration is a solution to existing problems, thereby associating problems with 
immigration. Her experiment showed that while elites can successfully link some potentially-
unrelated problems to immigration, other problems are already so strongly tied to 
immigration that elite visibility does not make a difference, for example a desire to preserve 
cultural unity (Ivarsflaten 2005, 24). 
 
3 Brexit explained: existing research on the Leave vote and opposition to immigration 
 
Explaining the Leave vote 
 
In the lead up to the referendum, many issues were on voters’ minds. Unequivocally 
though, immigration was at the fore, with 63 percent selecting it as the most pressing issue at 
the end of 2015 in a YouGov poll, well ahead of healthcare (39 percent) and the economy (33 
percent) (YouGov, cited in Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017, 11). Net migration reached 
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 336,000, and 69 percent said that migration from the EU was too high (Clarke, Goodwin, and 
Whiteley 2017, 11-12). 
Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley’s (2017) regression analyses found that while evaluations 
of the economy, immigration and the NHS each had statistically significant effects on support 
for EU membership, judgments about immigration actually exerted stronger effects than 
economic assessments (ibid., 84). Their analyses also revealed that the benefit-cost variable 
of Britain’s ability to better control immigration in a post-Brexit world was one of the most 
significant predictors of the Leave vote (ibid., 161). 
Additionally, perceptions of potential post-Brexit immigration levels differed between 
Leave and Remain voters. Among Leave voters, 84 percent thought there would be less 
immigration if Britain left the EU, compared with 27 percent of Remainers, according to a 
YouGov poll (YouGov/Times, cited in Hobolt 2016, 1263). 
However, most polls conducted around the time of the referendum revealed that 
sovereignty was the number one stated reason that people voted Leave, and immigration was 
the second. YouGov’s poll showed 45 percent selecting sovereignty and 26 percent choosing 
immigration, echoed by Lord Ashcroft’s result of 49 percent selecting sovereignty and 33% 
selecting immigration. The British Election Study found around 30 percent for each 
(YouGov, Lord Ashcroft, British Election Study, cited in Carl 2018, 2). 
The Leave campaign employed positive non-immigration messages including the renewal 
of sovereignty and democracy that would result if the UK left the EU. This appealed to 
middle-class Eurosceptics who may have privately agreed with negatively rhetorical anti-
immigration ideas but were conscious about potential tones of racism within the Leave 
campaign’s messaging. Another important message was the amount of money that could be 
redirected to the NHS if the UK left the EU. Although many Remainers contested the truth of 
this message, the idea that the NHS would be strengthened rather than weakened with a 
Brexit result resonated with Leavers (Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017, 59-60). 
Additionally, many Leave voters from the left contested that the EU had become an ‘uber-
capitalist’ club whose efforts threatened the possibility of nationalization of public services 
(ibid., 15). 
Overall though, while there were other issues that contributed to Vote Leave, it is clear 
that immigration was the dominant concern. Even in surveys that placed sovereignty 
concerns over immigration, it is clear that the two are not mutually exclusive — in fact, to the 
contrary, the desire for sovereignty can be read as a desire to control immigration. 
 
Explaining anti-immigration within the Leave vote 
 
While this article investigates whether racism motivated anti-immigrant sentiment; 
existing literature has also generated differing explanations for this attitude. 
The perceived economic burden of immigration has been a large contributor to its 
opposition. A very timely and widely circulated 2015 Bank of England report documented 
that rising immigration could impact wages of UK-born people, especially in semi- or 
unskilled labor forces (Nickell and Saleheen 2015). This caught media attention immediately; 
a Telegraph headline from December 2015 read “Mass migration driving down wages 
offered to British jobseekers” (Dominiczak and Spence 2015). Dustmann et al. (2013) also 
showed that the biggest impacts on wages of immigration occurred among low-wage 
workers, and that it was actually associated with an increase in wages of higher-paid workers, 
potentially creating widening inequality in the labor market (Dustmann et al., cited in Clarke, 
Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017, 113). This could contribute to the differing views from 
different occupational groups about EU membership (Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017, 
113). Interestingly, the Migration Advisory Committee found that EU migrants actually 
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 appeared to have no impact on UK-born employment while non-EU migrants were associated 
with a reduction in UK-born employment (Migration Advisory Committee, cited in Clarke, 
Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017, 113). Additionally, the perceived burden on the NHS is 
another economic concern that people had about immigration. The Vote Leave campaign 
strongly focused on the strain that immigrants exert on welfare resources. At the beginning of 
2016, healthcare professionals warned that the NHS was being ‘bled dry’ by ‘health tourists.’ 
In April, vote Leave released statistics claiming to show increased waiting times from 
immigrants’ pressure on the system. This was effective as surveys showed that the percentage 
of people thinking that it was beneficial for the NHS to leave the EU was consistently higher 
than those who thought that remaining would help (Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017, 
48). 
National identity’s role in producing anti-immigrant sentiment have also been explored in 
existing literature. Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley (2017) found that national identity was a 
significant predictor for having positive or negative attitudes towards the benefits and costs of 
immigration. As is widely documented in anecdotal evidence, those who identified as English 
were more likely than those who identified as British to emphasize the benefits of leaving the 
EU (ibid., 168). Hobolt (2016) found that European identity was a powerful predictor of the 
Remain vote (Hobolt 2016, 1269), while English national identity is more associated with 
national sovereignty (Wellings, cited in Hobolt 2016, 1270). 
Within the realm of identity, there has also been exploration on people’s perceptions on 
threats to cultural unity and minorities. There are widespread and entrenched negative 
attitudes towards minority groups among the whole British electorate, with survey data 
showing far more favorability towards the white majority than the four groups tested: Asians, 
Eastern Europeans, Blacks, Muslims (Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017, 102-3). 
However, Curtice (2017) found that a strong majority of Leave voters and a solid half of 
Remain voters favored requiring EU migrants to go through the same application processes 
as non-EU migrants (Curtice 2017, 40-1), indicating that the opposition to immigration in 
general may be based upon concerns with culture more than race. This fear of British cultural 
erosion is substantiated through investigations that find culture to be a bigger factor in anti-
immigration than economic concerns. Sobolewska and Ford (2017) found that people who 
thought immigration posed a threat to culture did not always have the same misgivings about 
equal opportunity programs for minorities. In fact, only half of those that were worried about 
culture said that equal opportunity programs had gone too far (Sobolewska and Ford 2017, 
21-2), indicating a deeper concern for cultural displacement than material. Some studies have 
also shown that concerns over national identity are more important than economic 
calculations in the context of European integration (Hooghe and Marks, cited in Clarke, 
Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017, 64). 
There is not an overwhelmingly dominant consensus in the literature about the relative 
importance of economic considerations and cultural, but the evidence for concerns about 
cultural erosion are strong. What follows is a deeper dive into how big of a role race plays in 
determining aversion to immigration within the 2016 referendum. 
 
4 Data Analyses 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
Analyses were conducted using Wave 8 of the UK Household Longitudinal Study 
(UKHLS), commonly known as Understanding Society. Wave 8 was conducted over two 
years from January 2016 to December 2017. Surveys were mostly conducted online, but 
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 households who had not participated were issued a face-to-face interviewer and finally a 
small amount of telephone interviewing also occurred. The individual questionnaire portion 
of the survey was used, which surveyed 31,166 adults aged 16 and over from 16,015 
households, who were mostly selected at Wave 1 in 2009. 
 
Analysis 
 
Wave 8 of the Understanding Society survey asks respondents how important “your 
ethnic or racial background” is to “your sense of who you are.” Using Wave 8 early release 
data, McAndrew, Surridge and Begum (2017) found that seeing race and ethnicity as 
important to one’s sense of identity was a statistically significant predictor of voting Leave, 
but only among White British. Among ethnic minorities, the importance of race to self-
identity was not statistically associated with either choice in the referendum (McAndrew, 
Surridge and Begum 2017, 18). These results show that, broadly, for white British, concerns 
over race are likely to play into their opinions on immigration. 
But, to determine with more nuance the extent to which race plays a role in anti-
immigrant sentiment, a comparison of the strength of people’s concerns about race with their 
financial concerns was made through a series of different models and analyses. 
In order to compare racial and economic attitudes, permutations of two variables were 
used. The first was the importance of skin color to one’s identity, which was recoded into a 
binary variable (important/not important). The second variable was satisfaction with income, 
which was also recoded into ‘satisfied’ and ‘not satisfied.’ Subsets of people who satisfied 
different permutations of these two variables were tested for their mean Leave vote 
proportion. 
The first question keeps income satisfaction constant: do people who are satisfied with 
their income and think skin color is important vote in the same way as those who are also 
satisfied with their income but do not think race was important? The first is a key group as 
they are likely to have less economic concerns, but worry about racial identity. The latter 
group is likely to be also economically stable but more ‘color-blind.’ If race were not an 
important factor in the leave vote, we could expect the two groups to vote in the same way. 
From the first race-conscious group, 45.0 percent voted Leave, while 39.7 percent voted 
Leave from the non-race-concerned group. This is a statistically significant difference (p-
value < 10-10), indicating that among people who were satisfied with their income, those that 
thought their race was an important part of their identity were more likely to vote Leave. 
 
 
People who are satisfied with income 
 Race is important Race is not important 
Leave 45.0% 39.7% 
Remain 55.0% 60.3% 
Total 100% 100% 
Table 1: Of those that are satisfied with their income, the Leave vote proportion differs 
according to attitudes on race. p-value for difference of means for Leave vote: 6.66 * 10-15 
 
 
The second question keeps racial attitudes constant: is the first group (satisfied with 
income and race-conscious) less likely to vote Leave than those that are also race-conscious 
but dissatisfied with their income? If race were not an important factor in the leave vote, we 
could expect the first group to be less likely to vote Leave as they are more satisfied with 
their financial state. A difference-of-means test found that the two groups do in fact vote 
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 differently to a statistically significant degree (p-value = 1.66 * 10-5). As stated above, 45.0 
percent of the first group voted Leave, while 49.4 percent of the economically dissatisfied 
group did, when keeping racial attitudes constant. This indicates that among people who are 
racially-conscious, economic evaluations are still significant for the referendum vote. 
A logistic regression was also modelled to substantiate these difference-of-means tests. 
The regression confirmed that when controlling for income satisfaction, the variable that 
measured the importance of race was a statistically significant predictor of the Leave vote (p-
value = 0.005). The regression also found that income satisfaction was a powerful predictor 
of the Leave vote. 
 
 
 Voting Leave 
Importance of race 
(standard error) 
      0.21834 *** 
(0.03523) 
Income dissatisfaction 
(standard error) 
      0.17719 *** 
(0.04011) 
Table 2: Results of logistic regression analysis.  
Importance of race: 1 = important, 0 = not important 
Income dissatisfaction: 1 = dissatisfied, 0 = satisfied 
 
 
The next analysis tests the role of race within the Brexit debates in a different way. Under 
the null hypothesis, if race played no role, those that are dissatisfied with the economy should 
vote in the same way regardless of their concerns with skin color. Dissatisfaction with the 
economy is measured using three variables available in the Understanding Society dataset: 
income dissatisfaction, unemployment and lack of job security in the next 12 months. These 
variables were each further subset into two groups: those that thought race was important and 
those that did not. Since the race question is the only ‘treatment’ variable, if the Leave vote 
proportion differed between race-conscious and non-race-conscious groups of economically 
dissatisfied people, then the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
The first test on people who were dissatisfied with their income found that there was a 
statistically significant difference between the mean Leave vote proportion for those that 
thought race was important and those that did not. This indicates that for those dissatisfied 
with their income, attitudes on race had an effect on likelihood to vote Leave. The second 
measure of economic dissatisfaction — unemployment — found similarly significant results. 
Of those who were unemployed, racial attitudes also made a statistically significant 
difference, with 54.0 percent of the race-conscious unemployed voting Leave and 47.4 
percent non-race-conscious unemployed voting Leave. The third measure of economic 
dissatisfaction was similar: for those that thought it was likely they would lose their job 
within the next 12 months, racial attitudes impacted decisions to vote Leave. It is evident that 
across three measures of economic dissatisfaction, attitudes on race still affected the Leave 
vote. 
 
5 Discussion 
 
Limitations 
 
Racist attitudes are difficult to survey, and therefore survey questions do not always 
wholly represent true attitudes towards different racial groups. The variable in the 
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 Understanding Society dataset that was most closely related to a respondents’ potential views 
towards racial minorities was a question that asked how important “your ethnic or racial 
background” is to “your sense of who you are.” This question acts as an important proxy for 
attitudes on race. While this merely relates to one’s personal identity, placing greater 
importance on race generally translates into greater sensitivity to race. The assumption for the 
purposes of this discussion is that for white British, more value and importance in their own 
race, plus sensitivity to and concern for race, corresponds to a sense of superiority and/or 
more racist attitudes. 
It is highly important to note the limitations in making such an assumption. It is possible 
to value one’s own white race or ethnicity in Britain and not view other racial groups 
negatively — since the question also specifies “ethnic background,” one probable example is 
a white Briton being proud of her Polish heritage. Additionally, for non-white British, placing 
importance on one’s ethnic identity does not have the same implication of superiority due to 
their minority status, which is a limitation not accounted for in the data. However, as 
mentioned, McAndrew, Surridge and Begum (2017) found a statistically significant 
correlation between placing importance on race and voting Leave for white Britons, which 
intuitively adds conviction to the assumption for discussion purposes. Furthermore, ignoring 
the use of this question as a proxy for racism, simply taking the variable at face value (the 
importance people place on racial identity) yields valuable findings in itself. 
Related limitations apply to the questions measuring economic concern. Similarly, these 
questions probe satisfaction with one’s own financial circumstance. As there were no 
questions on evaluations of the national economy, the questions used were: whether a 
respondent was satisfied with her income, whether she was unemployed, and a self-
evaluation of likelihood to lose her job in the next 12 months. These three different variables 
were used to build a more robust model of national economic dissatisfaction. It is important 
to note that personal satisfaction does not always translate into national, and vice-versa. 
Nevertheless, how attitudes towards race vary by economic status in itself is revealing and 
worthwhile to discuss. 
With these limitations addressed, the discussion of results should be taken in a broad 
sense, indicative of avenues of future research. 
 
Economic concerns versus racism 
 
Regression analysis demonstrated that when income was kept constant, racism was a 
statistically significant predictor of the Leave vote, consistent with intuition and past 
literature on attitudes towards racialized immigration in Britain (Dustmann and Preston, cited 
in Somerville 2007, 132; Ford 2011). When respondents are subset into those that are 
satisfied with their income and those who are not, both groups demonstrated that evaluations 
of race contributed to the Leave vote. 
A difference-of-means test confirmed that for respondents who were economically 
satisfied, racism mattered. Their attitudes toward race factor into their vote choice: if they are 
simultaneously racist, they are more likely to vote Leave. As the survey question was about 
personal financial situation, it is unknown if this group has national economic concerns. But, 
even so, race did play a statistically significant role in pushing respondents one way or 
another. 
Even for those that were financially dissatisfied, the vote was not simply about 
economics, contrary to some elite narratives. They did not all follow the same voting 
patterns; their racial attitudes mattered in determining their Leave vote. 
Consistent with past literature but inconsistent with contemporary elite rhetoric in the 
Brexit campaigns, people responded to their sociological concerns, despite efforts from some 
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 in the Leave camp to shy away from race-baiting. A review of the Leave campaign’s strategy 
and media coverage suggests that economics should have been more important. Granted, the 
analyses show that for more racist respondents, economics mattered. Those that are racist 
were more likely to vote Leave if they were also dissatisfied economically, and less if they 
were not. Keeping immigration at the fore of their campaign, Vote Leave focused on 
economic and cultural concerns with mass migration, sometimes twisting economic facts. 
The previously mentioned Bank of England report that garnered significant media attention 
was repeatedly used and misused. A Telegraph headline from December 2015 read “Mass 
migration driving down wages offered to British jobseekers” (Dominiczak and Spence 2015). 
Sir Stephen Nickell, one of the authors of the report claimed that his findings had been 
misrepresented and that the impact was “infinitesimally small” (Chu 2017). Conservative 
Member of Parliament Iain Duncan Smith said during the campaign that British wages are on 
average 10 percent lower because of EU immigration within the past decade. This claim was 
repeated by two senior figures in the campaign, including Boris Johnson (Chu 2017). Nigel 
Farage, outspoken former leader of UKIP, has been consistently espousing for years prior to 
the referendum that EU immigrants are a detriment to British jobs, saying in 2014 that there 
was a “massive oversupply” of foreign, unskilled labor, pushing wages of the British down 
(Graham 2014). Additionally, immigrants’ burden on the NHS was a Leave camp favorite. 
Conservative MP Priti Patel said “Current levels of migration are causing unsustainable 
pressure on our public services and we can see that the NHS is creaking under the strain” 
(Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017, 48). This is likely to fit with people’s intuitive logic 
that immigrants use NHS resources without contributing to its operation. The observed media 
and elite influence highlight efforts from the top to rid the debates of racism, instead using 
economic framing as much as possible, potentially as a façade of latent racism within sects of 
Leave voters. The data analyses demonstrate that latent racism was in fact still a major 
contributing force to the Leave vote, which the campaign did not dare to publicly admit. 
These results bolster the argument that economic framing was effective in appeasing social 
desirability effects of public rhetoric, while still allowing the Leave vote to flourish through 
private racist motivations. 
 
National identity 
 
Using national identity survey questions from Wave 6 and combining it with Wave 8 of 
the Understanding Society data, McAndrew, Surridge and Begum (2017) found that having a 
strong British identity — responding to the question “How important is being British to 
you?” with a 6 or more out of 10 — was a significant predictor of support for leaving the EU. 
Notably, this identity had a statistically significant association with the Leave vote for both 
white British and non-White British (McAndrew, Surridge and Begum 2017, 19). The fact 
that a strong national identity is associated with a desire to leave a supranational institution is 
not surprising, but the consistency among the white and non-white population is pertinent. 
Wanting to protect British national identity from the EU is therefore not associated with 
‘whiteness.’ For all races, feeling British led to a desire to reject the EU, suggesting that 
national identity concerns within the referendum debates were not framed around race. 
 
Culture 
 
People’s evaluations of race do not necessarily suggest the same about people’s attitudes 
towards cultural unity. Unfortunately, Wave 8 of the Understanding Society dataset’s 
questions on attitudes towards culture were exclusively asked in the ethnic minority boost 
sample. Thus, there was no way to analyze this data in conjunction with the referendum vote 
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 choice to yield an accurate picture of how concerns about cultural unity affected immigration 
debates in Brexit. 
But, both past literature and the current narrative point to the fact that people are 
protective of their culture. Section two of this article reviewed literature that supported the 
importance of cultural identity. The 1997 British Election Study found that 71 percent of 
white British prefer immigrants to adapt rather than keep their customs and traditions (British 
Election Study, cited in Saggar 2003, 186). It is clear that many white British prefer cultural 
unity to pluralism. This is not necessarily based on race, but since the white population is 
indigenous to Britain, perhaps there is a preference for sustenance of the native culture. 
Therefore, there could be resistance to immigration which would upset this. Since cultural 
concerns are not based on race, this hypothesis is consistent with wanting to limit 
immigration from the EU, even if the immigrants are white, because immigrants from within 
Europe also pose a cultural ‘threat.’ This article demonstrated that race was an important 
consideration in the Leave vote, but past literature has been able to place this within debates 
on culture. For example, Ivarsflaten’s (2005) model showed that concerns about cultural 
unity had a larger impact on anti-immigration than racism. 
An analysis of UKIP strategy and support affirms the importance of cultural concerns. 
Goodwin and Milazzo (2015) showed that public support for UKIP was partly motivated by 
feelings of anxiety over immigration, especially when this could threaten people’s identity 
and culture (Goodwin and Milazzo, cited in Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017, 64). At a 
UKIP conference in 2014, leader Nigel Farage said that immigration was making parts of the 
country “unrecognizable” and like “a foreign land.” He also later expressed during a press 
conference his discomfort at hearing foreign languages being spoken on a train (Sparrow 
2014). In the final month of the Brexit campaign, Michael Gove and Boris Johnson, key 
Leave figures, promised a points-based system that would require migrants to speak English 
(Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017, 54). 
When elite influence is taken in conjunction with past British public opinion showing 
aversion to cultural pluralism, it is apparent that people’s evaluations of culture may have 
played a part within anti-immigration debates in Brexit, separate from race’s impact. 
This article demonstrated that racism was a predictor of the Leave vote, but did not solve 
the puzzle of why there would be aversion to EU immigrants based on racism, given that the 
majority of these immigrants are white. A very likely explanation is that those who are 
sensitive to race are also sensitive to cultural unity. This article’s claim that racism is a 
powerful predictor does not counter the potential predictive power of a preference for cultural 
unity. Further research is necessary to disentangle the two. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
After June 2016, there has been a multitude of analyses that strived to dissect why Britain 
voted to leave the EU. Immigration was unanimously recognized to be the primary issue not 
only for the Leave campaign’s strategies, but also to voters. What caused anti-immigrant 
sentiment was a more complex question. The mobilization of concern over the perceived 
economic burden of mass migration was key, from increased job competition to a strain on 
welfare resources, namely the NHS. Analyses also showed strategies of cultural 
scaremongering to stoke public fears of cultural pluralism. There was also plenty of robust 
scholarship on public opinion towards immigration more generally, which also strived to 
compare economic concerns with sociological. 
This article sought to locate race within the anti-immigration debate. It asked the question 
of whether anti-immigrant sentiment was motivated more by racism or concerns with the 
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 economy in the 2016 referendum. Using new Understanding Society data from 2018, this 
article found that race mattered even when holding economic evaluations constant in 
determining individual referendum choices. 
The amalgam of past literature and this article’s analyses suggest that, although the 
British public and elites who advocated to exit the EU insisted that their campaign was not 
based on racism, people inherently respond to their sociological concerns when making a 
political determination about immigration. It is possible that many white Britons voted to 
curb immigration from the EU because they preferred that the UK retain its Anglo-Saxon 
culture — which would extend antipathy to include white EU immigrants. However, 
regardless of cultural attitudes, people’s racism was translated through the ballot box. Brexit 
was not simply about perceived declining economic conditions of the country — in 2016, the 
United Kingdom played the race card.  
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